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Sickness  absence  represents  a substantial  cost  in most  of Western  Europe,  whether  the
insurance  scheme  is  public  or private.  The  objective  of  this  study  was  to analyse  whether
waiting  time  for elective  treatment  in specialist  health  care  is associated  with  the  length
of  individual  sickness  absence  in Norway.  To  estimate  the  association  between  waiting
time  and  the  duration  of  sick  leave,  we  used  data  from  the  working  population  aged 18–67
years  in  2010–2012.  The  ﬁles  combined  register  data  from  The  Norwegian  Patient  Registry
with individual  characteristics  and  sickness  absence  data  from  Statistics  Norway,  and  was
analysed  using  zero-truncated  negative  binomial  regression.  We  found  that  about  one  in
four  employees  who  had one  or more  spells  of  sick  leave  in the  period,  was  also  waiting
for  consultation  or  treatment  in  specialist  health  care.  Yet, the  length  of  the  waiting  period
had  no  substantial  effect  on  the length  of  sickness  absence  (i.e.,  less  than  0.1%  reduction).
Therefore,  while  measures  to  reduce  waiting  times  for hospital  treatment  in many  instances
could  be beneﬁcial  for  the individual  patient,  such  policies  would  probably  not  have  any
substantial  impact  on  the national  sickness  absence  rate.
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. Introduction
Sickness absence is a major societal problem both in
erms of economic resources and public health [1], which
akes it important to consider strategies that can reduce
bsence which could be avoided. Sickness absence due to
aiting for specialist health care treatment is potentially
ne such type of avoidable absence.
Many patients in need of elective treatment ﬁnd them-
elves on waiting lists of varying length. Treatment queues
nd waiting lists are used to organize resources efﬁciently
nd to prioritize among patient groups, although from medical standpoint and from a patient-perspective, in
any instances it will be undesirable to wait for treatment.
nternationally, several policies to reduce waiting times
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have been implemented with varying degrees of success
[2,3]. If sickness absence could be reduced by shortening
waiting times, the gain from this could potentially out-
weigh the costs of reducing hospital waiting times.
There is little systematic knowledge on the relationship
between waiting times and sick leave. The main objec-
tive of this study is to investigate the relationship between
the waiting time for hospital treatment and long term
sick leave in the population. Our hypothesis is that shorter
waiting time reduces long-term sick leave. If a patient is sick-
listed awaiting treatment, and the anticipated treatment is
100% effective (i.e., the patient is healthy and without side-
effects after treatment), then the sick leave period would be
shortened by the same number of days as a treatment was
advanced. Hence, a delayed treatment also delays patient
recovery and return to work (RTW).
However, there are several elements which modify this
simple relationship. Medical conditions which lead to long-
term absence, but do not require referral to specialist
n access article under the CC BY-NC-ND license (http://creativecommons.
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health care will also reduce the anticipated effect of wait-
ing time on the duration of sickness absence. There are also
many conditions with less severe symptoms that, although
requiring hospital treatment, do not lead to sickness
absence during the waiting period. Moreover, treatments
have a varying degree of effectiveness. Some treatments
may  have side effects which lead to a longer rather than a
shorter sick leave. Some conditions known to cause long-
term absence are also hard to diagnose and treat (e.g.,
chronic fatigue syndrome, ﬁbromyalgia and chronic non-
speciﬁc musculoskeletal pain [4,5]). Finally, both the dura-
tion of the sick leave and the length of the period from refer-
ral to admission into specialist health care are most likely
contingent of the severity of the patient’s medical condi-
tion. In sum, there are a many situations where the effect
of waiting time on the duration of sick leave is ambiguous.
The effect should also vary across patient groups.
Decades of research has led to different types of expla-
nations of variations in sickness absence, from changes in
legislation and economic incentives [6–10], variations in
general practitioners’ (GPs’) sick listing practice [11–13],
economic cycles and enterprise downsizing [14–17], to
individual characteristics such as work ethics and vari-
ous types of social contagion [18–20]. The higher absence
rate among women has also received signiﬁcant attention
[21,22].
Previous research on waiting times and sickness
absence is limited, but ﬁndings mostly suggest a small,
positive effect of waiting times on the duration of sick
leave. Based on survey data with surgical patients at their
ﬁrst outpatient consultation, a Norwegian study from 1999
found that a majority of patients who were also sick-listed
believed that the treatment they were waiting for would
improve their ability to work. Their doctors, however,
were somewhat less optimistic [23]. A more recent study
from Norway evaluated a health policy reform targeted
at reducing both waiting times and sickness absence [24].
The study found that the obtained reduction in waiting
period for treatment or consultation in specialist health
care also reduced the duration of sick leave, but to a
lesser extent. The effect was stronger for surgical than
non-surgical patients. An unpublished working paper on
the duration of sick leave in Sweden found that waiting for
health care increased sickness absence [25]. A weakness
of the study, however, is that while sickness absence was
obtained using register data, waiting times were estimated
using survey data. Another Swedish study, which used
municipality level panel data on health care expenditure
and sickness absence and disability, found no substantial
effect of expenditure on absence [26].
We  assume that individual sick leave can be mod-
elled as a function of time waiting for treatment, medical
condition, individual traits such as age and gender, socioe-
conomic background, and their occupational sector and
industry. This is expressed in Eq. (1), where y is the length
of sick leave and W,  M,  I, S, O are vectors that describe
the relationships with waiting time, medical condition,
individual characteristics, socioeconomic status and occu-
pational afﬁliation.
y = f (W,  M,  I, S, O) (1)120 (2016) 1383–1388
Despite efforts to reduce sickness absence, long-term
sickness absence in Norway continues to be higher than in
the other OECD countries [27]. In Norway, sickness ben-
eﬁt is granted from the ﬁrst day of absence (100% of the
last wage). The ﬁrst sixteen days are paid by the employer,
while the subsequent period is covered by the social insur-
ance ofﬁce, and administered by the Norwegian Labour and
Welfare Administration (NAV). Registration of short-term
sick leave (usually up to eight days) can be done by the
workers themselves, without a medical assessment, while
sick leave beyond eight days requires medical assessment
and registration.
To our knowledge, this is one of the ﬁrst studies of the
relationship between sick leave and waiting time for elec-
tive treatments, and the ﬁrst to cover the entire population
of a country. To test the possible association between wait-
ing time and the duration of sick leave, we used register
data from the working population in Norway in 2010–2012,
including information on sick leave, hospital referral and
admission dates, medical condition, and sociodemographic
and -economic characteristics. Contrary to our expecta-
tions, we ﬁnd no substantial effect of waiting times on
long-term sickness absence. The implication of this is that
reduced waiting time in specialist health care will probably
not reduce sickness absence.
2. Materials and method
The study was based on data from two administra-
tive registers, Statistics Norway (SSB) and the Norwegian
Patient Registry (NPR). The data contained records for Nor-
wegian residents aged 18–67 in 2010–2012 (3 461 498
persons). Approval was obtained by The Regional Com-
mittees for Medical and Health Research Ethics and the
Norwegian Data Protection Authority (case no. 17/00368-
2).
2.1. Outcome variable
The dependent variable is the duration of sick leave.
Data on sick leave and duration of spells is administered
by SSB in a national register of all employees aged 16–69,
which contains start and end date of all sick leave registered
by a doctor. The lack of information on self-registered sick
leave does not pose a problem in our case, as short-term
absence mostly represents health problems which do not
require hospital treatment, which in most instances will
pass without any medical assistance at all (e.g. colds, the
ﬂu, and other temporary conditions). This is why  only sick
leave issued by GPs is registered. The data contained in
total 5 456 826 cases of sick leave from the population of
3 461 498 persons.
2.2. Explanatory variables
Data on length of time waiting for treatment, our main
explanatory variable, stemmed from NPR together with
hospital activity data. This included information activity
and waiting times in somatic and psychiatric hospitals and
specialized substance abuse treatment (PH/SSAT). Among
the variables in the NPR data is a variable that records
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if a person was  referred, 0 otherwise. We  also included
two variables which capture whether a person returned to
work before being referred, and whether a person was sick-
1 A simple logit regression model of the probability of being on sickK. Dyrstad et al. / Health
he date of the ﬁrst referral date to specialized treat-
ent. This date variable, together with a variable that
ecords the end date of the waiting time (when a med-
cal assessment or treatment is initiated) allows us to
alculate the number of days people wait for each treat-
ent [Waiting time (# of days)]. The data also includes
etailed medical information such as main and secondary
iagnoses (WHO’s International Statistical Classiﬁcation of
iseases and Related Health Problems 10th Revision (ICD-
0)), type of medical and surgical procedures (coded in
he Norwegian classiﬁcation system for surgical and med-
cal treatment, NCSP and NCMP), type of contact (medical
ssessment, treatment, or control), and level of care (inpa-
ient care, day treatment, or outpatient consultations). A
eparate record is generated in NPR each time a patient
s in contact with the specialist health services either for
ssessment, treatment, or follow-up. For the three years
nder consideration here, this amounts to approximately
9 000 000 records, of which 14 665 240 were from somatic
ospitals and 5 031 044 from PH/SSAT.
From the sick leave register we collected information
n diagnosis tied to the sick leave. However, due to a large
umber of missing observations, this information could not
e used. Hence, we were not able to cross-reference data
n diagnosis from hospitals with diagnosis from the sick
eave register to ascertain that their sick leave was related
o the same condition(s) as the one(s) they were waiting
or treatment for.
Data from SSB also contained information on gen-
er, age, marital status, the number of people in the
amily, family type, education, income, occupational his-
ory (employment/unemployment records), sector and
ndustry of the person’s workplace(s). Age is set to the
erson’s age in 2011. To control for a possible non-
inear relationship between age and sick leave, a squared
xpression of the age variable [Age squared] was also
ncluded. Marital status was coded so that registered
artners and married couples were given the same
tatus (along with widow(er) and surviving partner),
.e., four categorical variables: Unmarried/single, Mar-
ied/registered partner,  Widow(er)/surviving partner, and
ivorced/separated. Income was measured as average fam-
ly income in NOK 50 000 (approximately EUR 4000).
ccupational sector was coded into three categorical vari-
bles: Government services, County- or municipal services
nd Private sector.  Finally information on industry afﬁl-
ation (SN2007), based on the Norwegian adaptation of
he Statistical classiﬁcation of economic activities in the
uropean Community (NACE Rev. 2), was used to gener-
te a set of 21 control variables corresponding to the main
ategories of this classiﬁcation scheme. Information of a
ersons’ occupational history was used to exclude those
ho were either fully or partially unemployed during the
eriod under consideration.
.3. Data preparation and statistical approachA unique, project speciﬁc identiﬁer for each individual
ade it possible to combine the data from NPR and SSB
nto two different data ﬁles. While both contained infor-
ation on sick leave and socioeconomic data from SSB, one120 (2016) 1383–1388 1385
included data on referral and treatment from somatic hos-
pitals and the other from PH/SSAT. In both ﬁles, individual
records from 2010 to 2012 were aggregated to one record
per individual. This left us with a set of count variables,
e.g. the number of days on waiting lists [Waiting time (# of
days)], the number of waiting periods [Waiting period (# of
periods)], the number of days on sick leave [Sickness absence
(# of days)], and the number of hospital records with a par-
ticular diagnosis or treatment. This approach means that
the data is cross-sectional, not cross-sectional time series,
with the implication that this is not a causal analysis. The
order of the events was  accounted for using variables which
recorded whether a person returned to work before being
referred to hospital treatment, whether a person was sick-
listed while waiting for treatment, whether a person was
referred while being on a sick leave, or whether a person
was sick-listed after the waiting period had ﬁnished and in-
hospital treatment was  initiated. Another set of variables
recorded the average characteristics of individuals such as
mean age, education, and income over the three years.
The ﬁnal ﬁles consisted of 3 461 498 observations. In
other words, there was  one record per Norwegian resident
between 18 and 67 years of age in each ﬁle (somatic hos-
pitals and PH/SSAT). Individuals who were not employed
in any of the three years were excluded, as they would
not appear in the sick leave register. Due to concerns of
data quality, individuals with waiting times longer than
four years were also excluded. These exclusions resulted in
2 377 704 observations in the ﬁle with sick leave and wait-
ing time in somatic hospitals and 2 382 463 observations in
the ﬁle with sick leave and waiting time in PH/SSAT.
A zero-truncated negative binomial regression model
was used to estimate the association between waiting time
and number of days of sick leave. This is the most appro-
priate estimation technique for count data with no zeros
and over dispersion [28]. We  also tried a two-step negative
binomial hurdle model, where the ﬁrst stage models the
probability of being sick-listed, and the second stage the
duration of the sick leave, given that a person is sick-listed,
but ran into convergence problems in some of the speciﬁca-
tions. The zero-truncated model that we  employed yields
results equivalent to the second stage of the two-stage hur-
dle model.1
We  modelled number of days on sick leave as a function
of gender, age, education, family income, number of days
on a waiting list, and the number of times a person was
referred to specialist health care for a given medical condi-
tion (main chapter in ICD-10). To account for non-observed
variance between those referred to specialist health care
consultation or treatment and those who were not, we
included a dummy variable which takes the value of 1leave as a function of waiting time and sociodemographic characteristics,
which corresponds to the ﬁrst step of a two-stage hurdle model, identiﬁes
a  statistically signiﬁcant (p < 0.001), but very weak, association between
being on sick leave and waiting times (OR ≈ 1.000 for both somatic hos-
pitals and PH/SSAT).
1386 K. Dyrstad et al. / Health Policy 120 (2016) 1383–1388
Table 1
Descriptive statistics for selected variables.
Variables Mean Standard deviation Min/max
Somatic PH/SSAT Somatic PH/SSAT
Sickness absence (# of days) 71.13 71.32 139.01 139.24 0/5235
Waiting time (# of days) 52.39 2.2 119.23 18.03 0/1449
Sickness absence (# of spells) 0.46 0,40 0.64 0.50 0/6
Waiting periods (# of periods) 0.93 0.06 1.51 0.33 0/51
Mean Standard deviation
Age  40.46 13.20 17/68
Male  0.51 0.49 0/1
1.66 0/8
) 146 000 000 3 730 000 000
, 2 382 463 (PH/SSAT)
Table 2
Estimated number of days on sick leave in somatic and PH/SSAT hospitals,
zero truncated negative binomial regression.
Somatic hospitals PH/SSAT
Waiting time (# days) 1.000 1.001
(48.58)*** (8.89)***
Referred to specialist health care 0.893 1.144
(35.63)*** (13.35)***
Male 0.830 0.805
(86.94)*** (99.21)***
Age 1.058 1.055
(93.26)*** (86.74)***
Age squared 0.999 1.000
(79.74)*** (70.35)***
Education 0.953 0.948
(75.58)*** (81.91)***
Family income (50’ NOK) 1.000 1.000
(5.16)*** (−0.88)
Not employed all three years 1.354 1.339
(108.55)*** (102.62)***
Married/registered partnera 1.000 1.009
(0.00) (3.24)**
Widow(er)/surviving partnera 1.059 1.029
(6.52)*** (3.21)**
Divorced/separateda 1.077 1.068
(21.65)*** (18.92)***
Number of persons i family 0.990 0.998
(11.79)*** (2.13)
Municipality sectorb 1.043 1.040
(17.51)*** (16.15)***
Public sectorb 0.970 0.973
(9.81)*** (8.62)***
RTW before waiting period 0.542 0.593
(179.84)*** (47.87)***
Sick leave after waiting period 0.810 0.745
(89.15)*** (32.50)***
N 935 090 938 256
IRR (incidence rate ratio), z-score in parenthesis.
a Unmarried/single individuals make up the reference category.Education (0 = no education, 8 = PhD level) 4.45 
Family  income, NOK (median in parenthesis) 13 400 000 (800 253
N  2 377 704 (Somatic)
listed after hospital treatment. Table 1 provides descriptive
statistics for the two ﬁles.
3. Results
About 26% of employees with one or more periods of
sickness absence in 2010–2012 were also waiting for con-
sultation or treatment in a somatic hospital, while only 3%
were waiting for consultation or treatment in PH/SSAT. Ini-
tial analysis showed that absence was signiﬁcantly higher
among employees who were referred to specialist health
care than among sick-listed employees who were not wait-
ing for in-hospital consultation or treatment. Overall, the
mean number of absent days among employees who expe-
rienced one or more spells of sick leave was 159 days.
Among those who were sick-listed and waiting for treat-
ment, the mean number of days on sick leave in the
period was 171 days, compared to 143 days among employ-
ees who experience one or more spells of sick leave, but
were not referred to somatic hospital treatment. Within
PH/SSAT, the difference was even larger; 172 days versus
265 days.
Table 2 presents results from the empirical analysis
— somatic and PH/SSAT hospitals, respectively. Starting
with the explanatory variable of main interest, the number
of days waiting for consultation or treatment in special-
ist health care, we found no substantial relationship. In
somatic hospitals, one additional day waiting for hospital
treatment corresponded to less than 0.1% increase in the
number of days on sick leave. Given the mean waiting time
of 159 days, this corresponds to 0.16 days, or only a cou-
ple of hours. In PH/SSAT, the association was also less than
0.1%. In other words, while statistically signiﬁcant, the sub-
stantial effect was close to zero. Thus, we found no support
for the hypothesis that shorter waiting time is associated
with lower long-term sick leave. The result was robust to
a number of different model speciﬁcations (see Section 3.1
below).
As explained above, we also included a dichotomous
variable to control for whether a person was referred to
specialist health care or not. We  found a notable differ-
ence in the association of being referred either to a somatic
hospital or to a PH/SSAT. In average, a person referred
to consultation or treatment in somatic hospitals spent
almost 10% fewer days on sick leave than those who  were
not. In contrast, people referred to PH/SSAT had almostb Private sector is the reference category.
** p < 0.01.
*** p < 0.001.
15% more days of sick leave than employees who were not
referred to such treatment.
Turning to the control variables, our results correspond
well with previous research on sickness absence. Men  had
about 20% shorter absence than women. The duration of
sick leave was also associated with higher age at a rate
of about 5% per year. The squared term indicated that the
association was weaker at the highest levels of age, at least
within somatic hospitals (an incidence rate ratio for age
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quared 0.999 means that for the oldest employees (68
ears old), the positive correlation with age is reduced by
0.001 × 682=) 4.6%).
Also in line with previous research, on the importance
f socioeconomic status, the duration of sickness absence
as shorter among people with higher levels of educa-
ion. Compared to people with no education, people with
ducation at the PhD level had about 40% shorter sickness
bsence. In the ﬁle for somatic hospitals, the net effect of an
ducation at the PhD level (coded with a value of 8) is 37.6%
(0.953 − 1) × 8), while the difference in PH/SSAT is 41.6%
(0.948 − 1) × 8). In comparison, the relation with income
as smaller; less than 0.1% per NOK 50 000 increase. As
xpected, widow(er)s and divorcees had more sickness
bsence than others.
Compared to employees in the private sector, employ-
es in the municipality or county services had about 4%
onger spells of absence, while employees in the gov-
rnment services had about 3% shorter absence. The
ifferences are relatively small, given the high levels of
ickness absence in the municipality services. A possible
xplanation for this, supported by our material, is that
uch of the absence in the municipality service sector is
 function of employee characteristics, such as gender and
evel of education.
.1. Sensitivity analysis
To account for possible differences in the association
etween sickness absence and waiting time among dif-
erent patient groups, we ran the models on different
ubgroups (e.g., deﬁned by gender, age group, sector,
ndustry, types of medical and surgical procedure, and
ain diagnosis). We  also included a squared expression
f income, as the association of income may  be present
nly at the highest levels of income. In addition, we  strati-
ed the data by duration of sickness absence and length of
aiting time, to see if the correlation was stronger among
atients with e.g., medium-long spells of absence, or wait-
ng periods of a certain length. We  also included a squared
xpression of days on waiting list to test for a non-linear
elationship. None of these exercises produced any sub-
tantially different results.
.2. Study limitations
The aggregation from several to one record per indi-
idual, described above, implies a loss of information, as
e did not follow individual trajectories from one day
o another. Consequently, we cannot rule out the possi-
ility that a more ﬁne-grained analysis of the day-to-day
rajectory could have identiﬁed stronger correlations for
ome subgroups of patients. However, the consistent lack
f any substantial effect of the number of days waiting
or assessment or treatment across model speciﬁcations
nd subgroups populations indicates that independently of
ggregation level, overall sickness absence is probably not
trongly related to time spent waiting for hospital treat-
ent.120 (2016) 1383–1388 1387
4. Discussion
We  started out this paper with the expectation that
waiting time in specialist health care was  associated with
sickness absence, so that lower waiting times could lead to
reduced sickness absence. However, our ﬁndings provide
little support for this. In the period 2010–2012, about one
out of four employees experienced one or more spells of
absence while at the same time waiting for consultation
or treatment, mainly in somatic hospitals. We also found
that sick-listed employees who were also on a waiting list
had a signiﬁcantly longer absence than those who were not
referred to specialist health care. However, in the statistical
analysis, where we  also controlled for other factor known
to inﬂuence the duration of sick leave, such as age, gender,
and socioeconomic status, we found no substantial connec-
tion between waiting time and the duration of sick leave.
On the other hand, we found that those referred to somatic
hospitals on average had shorter spells of sick leave than
those who were not, while sick-listed referred to PH/SSAT
had longer spells of absence.
It is well documented that good health is unequally dis-
tributed in the population [29,30], and the social gradient
in health is also present in sickness absence [31]. How-
ever, a large share of sickness absence is caused by medical
conditions which do not necessarily have a quick ﬁx, nor
do they require treatment in specialist health care [24]. In
Norway, about 60% of man-days lost to sickness absence
are related to musculoskeletal disorders and mental health
problems [32], none of which necessarily require specialist
health care consultation or treatment.
Another factor which may  inﬂuence the relationship
between waiting time and sickness absence is the prior-
itization within the health care system, where more severe
conditions and cases where treatment is more likely to
be effective are given priority. Hence, more severe medi-
cal conditions can lead to prolonged sickness absence, but
also shorter waiting time. The combination of these two
factors — medical conditions which do not need specialist
health care consultation but produce long-term sickness,
and severe medical conditions which lead to both long-
term sickness and expedient access to necessary specialist
health care treatment, may  explain why  the length of sick-
ness absence seems to be unrelated to the length of waiting
time. Hence, policies to reduce waiting times could be ben-
eﬁcial from a patient perspective, but will probably not be
effective in reducing national sickness absence.
5. Conclusion
To our knowledge, this is the ﬁrst study which uses pop-
ulation register data to estimate the association between
waiting times in specialist health care and sickness
absence. While previous research is limited, the ﬁndings
indicate that waiting times may  prolong sickness absence
[23,25]. Contrary to these studies, we  ﬁnd no systematic
relationship between the two. One explanation for these
divergent ﬁndings could be that previous studies were
based on some degree of self-reporting, and the studies
did not include the whole working population. While our
study does not discard the possibility that shorter wait-
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ing time could reduce sickness absence in some groups
of sick-listed patients, or otherwise be beneﬁcial, we ﬁnd
no evidence that the overall sickness absence would be
signiﬁcantly reduced if the time from referral to admis-
sion to hospital assessment or treatment was reduced. In
other words, policies to reduce waiting time for elective
treatment in Norway would probably not generate any
substantial spillover effect for the national rate of sick-
ness absence. To reduce the sickness absence rate, other
interventions would have to be considered. Future studies
should see if these ﬁndings are valid in other contexts as
well.
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